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Abstract
This paper examines three functions of music technology in the study of music. Firstly, 
as a tool, secondly, as an instrument and, lastly, as a medium for thinking. As our 
societies become increasingly embroiled in digital media for representation and 
communication, our philosophies of music education need to adapt to integrate these 
developments while maintaining the essence of music. The foundation of music 
technology in the 1990s is the digital representation of sound. It is this fundamental 
shift to a new medium with which to represent sound that carries with it the challenge 
to address digital technology and its multiple effects on music creation and 
presentation. In this paper I suggest that music institutions should take a broad and 
integrated approach to the place of music technology in their courses, based on the 
understanding of digital representation of sound and these three functions it can serve. 
Educators should reconsider digital technologies such as synthesizers and computers 
as music instruments and cognitive amplifiers, not simply as efficient tools.
Introduction
The computer is an instrument as a well as a tool. Thinking about the computer as a 
musical instrument recognises its ability to be a medium of human expression, places it 
in a category familiar to music educationalists, and situates it in an artistic (rather than 
scientific) context. The use of the term computer throughout this paper will stand for all 
computer-based devices employing binary logic, more generally referred to as digital 
media. For music, such devices include synthesizers, MIDI equipment, general purpose 
computers, and digital recording systems. I will explore the computer-as-instrument 
metaphor through vignettes describing the effects of this shift in the composition and 
performance education of two students.
Russell and Joyce are music students whose early use of computer was as tool, but 
whose usage changed significantly when conceived as an instrument. Russell’s story 
starts as a 14 year old who began his use of computers for music with sequencing 
programs as part of compositional activities in the music classroom. Russell was a 
reasonably proficient piano player and enthusiastic music student. Joyce, as a 21 year 
old music degree graduate who majored in orchestral composition, made early use of 
computers as a tool for publishing music notation. Both Russell and Joyce later became 
engaged with the computer as an instrument for composition and performance and 
their stories continue below; but first I will examine the cause of the computer-as-tool 
conception, and outline the case for its conception as instrument.
Humanity and technology
Technology and humanity are not a dualism, but the tool-conception treats them as 
such. In this conception a separation is drawn between people and objects in the 
world. This idea is not only rejected by s o m e philosophers but by a few musicologists 
including Nicholas Cook who suggests that rather than being something apart, music is 
in the very midst of things. In fact it is less of a ’something’ than a way of knowing the 
world, a way of being ourselves. And further Cook acknowledge that the tool-
conception is not confined to modern music technologies but that ’the metaphor of 
music being a kind of object is built deep into its [music’s] history’ (1998: vii). Coming 
to a humane conception of technology requires acknowledgment that being 
technological is a human trait, not an independent force. The Film ’2001 A Space 
Odyssey’ is a vivid example of this understanding. In the history of human 
technological development is portrayed from the first use of sticks and bones as clubs 
to long range space vehicles and the autonomous computer ’Hal’. The presence of the 
monolith, a persistent alien block with perfect dimensions, provides the film with a 
spiritual overtone and indeed being technological is about as basic a human trait as 
being spiritual. The notion of a human-technology dualism, more often referred to as 
the subject-object dualism, has a long philosophical history in discussions of 
metaphysics and of divisions between praxis and poiesis (Heidegger, 1977). 
For music, this history resonates back to the integration of mathematics and sound by 
Pythagoras, and flared significantly in ancient debates surrounding the incorporation of 
instrumental music into Christian worship. The fallout from these dualistic ideas, arising 
from Plato’s division between body and soul and taken further by Aristotle’s perceptual 
primacy and rigid divisions of those perceptual objectifications, has resulted in the 
separation of (portrayed as a conflict between) humanity and technology. 
In arguing against such a dualism I build upon the criticisms of Aristotelian metaphysics 
by Martin Heidegger who w a s concerned about such an objectified view of 
technology (Heidegger, 1977). One of the most helpful methods of desolving this 
division between people and technologies is to deepen the conception of technology 
to understand how it is part of humanity. Therefor, I define technologies as being the 
products of the objectification of experience. The objectification arises from the 
dualistic stance toward the world discussed above and applies to experience in the 
broad rational and emotional sense proposed by John Dewey, not only to 
epistemological knowledge (Hickman, 1990).
As a first step, we can consider that all physical musical devices are technologies. 
Utilitarian devices such as tuning forks and metronomes are physical objects we use as 
tools, and the computer can certainly function as tool in this utilitarian fashion. Physical 
devices also include musical instruments as varied in their engineering complexity as 
the drums of western Africa and the pipe organs of European cathedrals. Computers, in 
various physical forms, can be seen as adding to this tradition of engineered 
instruments.
In talking about the computer as musical instrument I am not only arguing for a re 
conception of the computer as an instrumental medium—although that maybe the 
primary re conception—but for an understanding that all technologies are potential 
musical mediums; latent musical instruments. A medium has the feature of filtering and 
enhancing what passes through it, like the wood and pipe of a marimba. But being an 
instrument is more than being a medium. Being a musical instrument is not so much a 
given property of some physical or metaphysical status, but can be defined by how it is 
employed or related to. Further, there are musical objects which do not have a solid 
physical form but are symbolic. Predominant amongst these are the various systems of 
visual notation, including common practice notation, tablature, solfege, and so on. Also 
included are specialised words with musical meaning, such as ’largo,’ ’riff,’ or ’mute.’ 
Musical symbols are technological objects which are created to represent elements of 
musical understanding and experience. A third step in understanding the pervasiveness 
of technology in humanity is to realise that musical objects, both physical and 
symbolic, are representations of various musical ideas and theories which underlie 
them. These theories include pitch systems, methods of conceiving time divisions, 
performance practices, knowledge of acoustics, spiritual myths, and so on. These 
theories, too, are technologies; like physical objects and symbols they are ways of 
capturing our musical understandings, and thus captured become objects separate 
from the experience which generated them.
All of the ways which we try to hold on to music, from constructing theories about 
sonic frequency relations, to writing it down, or storing it in computer memory, are all 
technological means of representing it. All technologies in this conception are mediums 
through which music can be expressed. Finally, in order to be complete if perhaps 
controversial when we define technologies as the represented outcomes of our 
experience, music itself can be seen as a technology. Music-making can be conceived 
as a technological act. Music is not an object that exists in the world for us to examine, 
it is a product of our efforts and experience, but the objects which arise for and in that 
making, are technologies. While these perspectives are still dualistic, deeper 
conceptions are not ones of conflict commonly felt with the computer. The attitude of 
control is thus replaced by one of partnership where computers are conceived as 
instruments; controlling and utilising are replaced by a notion of engaging.
Engagement
As a tool the computer is conceived as a device apart from the musician, which is used 
for its efficiency. Underlying this use is an attitude of control, and with it the threat of 
not having control, or worse, being controlled by it. No such threat is generally felt from 
musical instruments, not because they are not technologies, but because in our 
understanding of a musical instrument there is a notion of partnership and cooperation 
towards a musical end. This is reflected in our language where people are said to use a 
tool, while they play an instrument.
A sense of involvement with music and a kind of selflessness becomes possible with 
technology through engaged activity. By the term engagement I refer to a sense of 
intimacy with and sensitivity to the sound materials and the way the partnership with 
the instrument shapes those materials. When musicians are engaged in music making 
with their instrument(s) it is not uncommon for them to describe a sense of being lost in 
the flow of music (Ciskszentmihalyi, 1996). When engaged in music making with an 
instrument, there is no perception of a dualistic relation, only of an interaction with 
music. This sense of engagement occurs despite, or at times because of, the 
participation of particular technologies in the music making.
Engagement can occur, I argue, in both composition as well as performance. It is more 
intuitive to expect engagement in the real-time interaction of performance, but 
engagement is not restricted to real-time activities; composers can be very engaged in 
music making over long periods with a variety of technologies. Engagement is a n 
interaction with music which arises more easily within a spirit of partnership with an 
instrument than it does with the tool-usage approach. In Heideggerian language the 
instrument attitude is one where the technology is present with us, rather than ready for 
us. Heidegger seeks to distinguish between technology working with us, rather than 
technology as a slave awaiting orders, a relationship differential similar to the 
instrument and tool metaphors I am presenting. Before describing how people can 
become engaged, and how educationalists can foster an engaged attitude with 
computing devices as instruments, I will return to the experiences of Russell and Joyce.
After Russell’s initial use of sequencing software in class, the opportunity arose for him 
to study synthesizer performance at his school and to join the synthesizer ensemble. 
He saw this as a way of building on his piano skills, playing more rock and jazz 
influenced music which he enjoyed, and getting social interaction by joining an 
ensemble. Russell was able to use the synthesizer as an instrument at first by 
understanding it as a piano substitute with a sound generating engine which was 
simply a tool for making noises. But after some years learning the synthesis 
programming and live timbral manipulation techniques which are part of synthesizer 
playing, his conception of the synthesizer shifted to one where the synthesis engine 
became the instrument controlled by a keyboard,in his case.This change in 
understanding was reinforced by the synthesizer ensemble where wind, guitar, and 
percussion controllers were used.With his new found synthesizer-as-instrument 
understanding, Russell began experimenting with computer based signal processing 
software and in particular doing remixes and cut-ups for dance parties. He became so 
proficient at this that it became a regular source of income and he formed a live 
remixing ensemble who performed at raves. For Russell, the computer and its sound 
processing and manipulating capabilities became his instrument for composition and 
performance.
Joyce was accepted into a post-graduate composition course at a European computer 
music centre. Here she was exposed to intense courses in computer assisted 
composition and sound synthesis. As part of this course Joyce learned how to use a 
computer to manipulate music and to generate sophisticated modifications and 
treatments which became part of, or further simulation for, her pieces which remained 
predominantly for acoustic instrument performance. At this stage, the computer 
became an inseparable part of those compositions even though it made no 
contribution to the performances. The computer was the medium through which her 
musical thoughts were filtered and amplified, taking over the role previously served by 
a piano. The final step to a convincing instrument-like partnership came when Joyce 
began working on mixed pieces; for acoustic instrument and electronics. For these 
pieces she created prepared sections of electronic backing using various synthesis 
techniques. These pieces thus became duets for two instruments; one acoustic, the 
other electronic. She was not only composing with the computer as a medium, but for 
the computer as an instrument. There were various synchronising considerations for 
live performance of these works which involved a mix of computer following and 
transforming the acoustic performance, including the setting and triggering of events by 
a human. In these pieces the two instruments both required a human performer, and to 
s o m e extent the computer also became the performer. A counterpoint with computer 
In these experiences of Russell and Joyce, what was it that led to the engagement 
between musician and computer? Many things, of course; some of them personal, 
others social, and some technological. I will now discuss a few I think are significant.
Partnership
A computer’s capacities, provided by its hardware and software features, should 
complement the skills of the musician. A partnership is like a duet, each partner 
providing capabilities which combine in the musical result.This means that engagement 
arises where computers do not simply duplicate tasks which people are good at, but 
are used to make speedy calculation, remember and organise large amounts of 
information, generate unique sounds, apply spatialisation treatments, and so on.
Familiarity
Engagement cannot arise from a superficial understanding of, or interaction with, an 
instrument. Russell’s experiences lasted several years, while Joyce’s were over one very 
intensive year of full-time attention. Familiarity requires time spent exploring the 
instrument, learning how others utilise it, and becoming sensitive to its abilities and 
idiosyncrasies. It is this notion of familiarity being more significant than real-time 
feedback, that enables engagement in compositional tasks.
Challenge
A deep level of engagement and enjoyment requires a balance of skills and challenges 
(Ciskszentmihalyi, 1996). For both Russell and Joyce, the shift to conceiving the 
computer as an instrument arose through new musical opportunities and challenges 
provided by the instrument in harmony with increases in their skill development. This 
cycle of increasing challenges and skills is ongoing in situations where engagement is 
regular.
Meaning
When the musical activities that musicians are involved with are valued by them,and 
those around them, engagement is more likely.Both Russell and Joyce were working in 
styles of music they enjoyed and which they felt were valued by their peers and the 
institutions and societies in which they worked; in short, their musical activities with 
computer were meaningful for them, not trivialised.
The computer as instrument
In order to encourage students to use computers to engage with music rather than 
simply as a tool, a number of principles seem to suggest themselves from the above 
discussion.
Integration
If a computer is to have any chance of being treated as a musical partner, it needs to 
become part of the life of the music department just as other instruments are. This 
includes being available for use in music classrooms for general use (not at the 
computer lab) and available in ‘practice’ rooms for individual use. As well, computer 
music works need to be included in concerts, CD’s, and other public presentations.
Specialisation
Students should be able to study computer music as a principle study. While it is useful 
to all students to have some access to computing resources, particularly for tool 
functions music) publishing, there must be provision for some students to become 
experts in computer music composition, synthesizer performance, and digital media 
production.
Quality
All music educationalists are concerned with providing quality experiences for their 
students. Computer music-making is no different. Particular care should be taken with 
assessing students’ computer music, as many teachers may be unfamiliar with practices 
and standards. I believe that maintaining a consistent ear for general musical values 
goes much of the way, being careful not to simply transfer value systems from other 
musical styles. Quality of repertoire and musical product can be maintained by 
increasing exposure to what experienced computer musicians are doing via CD’s, visits 
to concerts, and guest visits. Regarding the quality of equipment, it is important to listen 
to the systems and trust your ears on sound quality. Also look to what experienced 
computer musicians are doing and using, copy them and seek their advice.
Reward
To encourage greater use of the computer as an instrument there need to be incentives. 
These can come in many forms, but the most valuable will be recognition via public 
performance, prizes, and personal encouragement. It is important that the students’ 
work with computers and synthesizers is seen as being as valuable as other musical 
activities. This is another reason to enable specialisation and monitor quality, because 
superficial recognition of clearly mediocre results is usually quite transparent to 
students.
Conclusion
Computer technologies have a place in a humane music education. To help 
educationalists find that place I am encouraging a conception of computer as musical 
instrument rather than simply as tool. Such a re conception promotes students’ 
engagement with music rather than a control and dominate attitude toward music and 
the world. Along the way I have deconstructed the metaphysical notion that humans 
and technology are opposing poles of a win-or-lose duality, preferring to explore the 
way in which being technological is part of being human. Seen in this light, all music 
making is a human technological act and the computer is just one of many 
technologies with which we make music.
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